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The view about systematic irrationality of investors and managers in investment with 
reference to information and communication technology (ICT) with no effects on 
productivity growth is called productivity paradox. Research suggests that ICT return in 
developed nations is significant and positive, but not in developing countries. This paper 
challenges the above conclusion by examining the contribution of ICT to the Chinese 
economic growth. We investigate the relationship between TFP growth and ICT capital and 
provide estimation of the returns to ICT investment. The contribution of ICT to economic 
growth has not been studied earlier for the developing countries like China. The empirical 
results suggest that China has reaped the benefits of ICT investment. The policy implications 
for the Chinese ICT investment and development are also discussed. The results add to our 
understanding of how ICT affects growth in the context of economic development.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
From the beginning of 1980s, when the information age was initiated, there has been a 
long-running debate in economic literatures on whether the information and communication 
technology (ICT) revolution is being paid off in productivity improvement. When Robert 
Solow, the Nobel Laureate Economist, commented that, “you can see the computer age 
everywhere but not in the productivity statistics”, the doubt of the fundamental economic 
principle that investors and managers are not systematically irrational rose among the 
business, organizations, government, and management researchers. This is the so called 
productivity paradox (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2001).   
However, in recent year more evidences have converged in the similar conclusion that the 
return to ICT in developed nations is significant and positive, but not in developing countries. 
This paper will challenge this kind of proposition on the developing countries by examining 
the case of China. However, we do not claim that a single case study provides evidences of 
rejection of the productivity paradox, nor China represents the entire developing world. But 
in terms of size, economic development and investment in technology give China a stronger 
weight to the results presented here. It is believed in this paper that it is the lack of sufficient 
data with high quality, which lead to the paradox debate and the wrong interpretation of the 
ICT growth relationship in the analysis of developing countries. 
While China has emerged as a large economy in the world, the empirical research in China 
has been scarce and neglected for its data availability, relatively low research capacity and 
lack of trust in the public register-based data quality. In 1990s, China developed its ICT 
sector with the average speed which is 4 times of the world average, and it is the largest 
telephone users and second largest Internet users in the world. But there are few papers that 
examine the contributions of ICT to Chinese economic growth. Meng and Li (2002) provide 
some evidences on China’s ICT industrial development and diffusion in recent years. And 
they mentioned that although there is still a huge gap between China and the developed 
countries in the development of ICT industry, yet the astonishing pace of its progress shows 
promise for the country’s New Economy. They also showed a clear digital divide among the 
nation’s three economic regions including East, West and Central. It is to be noted that, Meng 
and Li used no specific methodology in their analysis. In related research, the most frequently 
used methodology is growth accounting. Subsequently, it is not possible to conduct an 
international comparison of previous findings. With the exception of Meng and Li we have 
not been able to trace other studies that use Chinese data and relevant to our case.   
This paper makes contribution to the growing literature on the impacts of ICT on economic 
growth by providing new results, which is based on data not published previously and an 
informative and up-to-date literature review. It challenges the productivity paradox 
conclusion by examining the contribution of ICT to Chinese economic growth. We provide 
some empirical evidences that China has reaped in ICT investment, specifically. The aim is 
firstly to investigate the relationship between TFP growth and ICT capital by using Chinese 
data. The contribution of ICT to economic growth has not been previously examined for 
developing country like China. Secondly, to provide estimation of returns or lack of returns to 
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shares of capital and labor. The ICT data is not published before. Thirdly, we introduce a 
capital share which unlike the existing approaches it is based on the development of the 
capital variable, time variant and reflect the development of capital-labor substitution patterns 
well. Fourthly, we will discuss the policy implications for the Chinese ICT development and 
investment patterns. Finally, we suggest guidelines for future research in general and also in 
the China case in particular. The results are of great interest by adding to our understanding 
of how ICT affects growth in the context of economic development.   
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses ICT as infrastructure and a 
necessity to economic development. Section 3 will review the literature on the impacts of ICT 
on economic development at different levels of aggregation. The ICT sector in China and 
some data issues and challenges posed by the availability of data is discussed in Section 4 and 
Section 5. The growth accounting and regression analysis to measure the impacts of ICT on 
economic growth are introduced in Section 6. Section 7 presents the empirical results from 
the above methodologies to estimate the contribution of ICT investment on output growth in 
China at the national level. Suggestions to ICT development and investment at the central 
government level are provided. Section 8 concludes the paper and provides guidelines for 
future  research.   
 
2.  ICT AS AN INFRASTRUCTURE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 The scope of ICT 
According to International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the type of ICT devices and 
services useful for improving the working efficiency and studying access to the information 
society includes radio, television, fixed telephone, mobile telephone, personal computer, and 
the Internet. The first three are often considered as old ICT devises while the latter three are 
considered as new ICT devises. In the manufacturing domain, computer aided manufacturing 
equipments are calculated in ICT. In addition to this, software sometimes considered 
separately from computer and Internet as an independent category to get more detailed 
implication. 
Most international comparisons of ICT are based on the ICT capital stock available in the 
country. ICT capital stock is measured by estimated data based on ICT investment 
expenditure. This is usually not a very reliable or universally available statistic compared to 
those obtained through data surveys. In this research, the aggregate investment in ICT 
infrastructure (computer hardware, software and communication equipment) is considered in 
obtaining the ICT capital stock in China. Not surprisingly, this in similarity with many other 
measures will also underestimate the contribution of ICT. Among other measures, subject to 
same criticism, include software, personal expenditure in ICT and auto-manufacturing 
equipments which are not accounted for. At the same time, the low price of piratical software 
will underestimate the investment and the influence of ICT. So it will never be accurate if we 
limit the ICT measure to software expenditure to measure the software or ICT contribution to 
economic growth. 
 
  22.2 The ICT development in the world 
The 1990s was the golden age for the world wide telecommunication development. The 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of telecom revenue was more than 8%. Figure 1 
shows that the revenue for Telecommunication Service increased from US$400 billion in 
1991 to more than $1 trillion in 2003. Correspondently, the market revenue of telecom 
equipment grows at the same rate which was US$120 billion in 1991 and up to US$300 
billion. In 2003, the ratio of service and equipment keeps 10/3 in this period. This market is 
expected to increase continuously due to the growth in mobile telephone and personal 
computer markets. 
After a close examination of the breakdown of increases in above, the fact that mobile 
telecommunication and Internet user occupies the top increases can be easily found. In 2003, 
the number of fixed telephone subscribers in the world was only 1,123 million, in contrast to 
this, the number of mobile telephone subscribers was 1,341 million which is 218 million 
more than former. In the Figure 2, the main telephone lines, mobile cellular subscribers, 
international telephone traffic in minutes, personal computers and internet users are shown 
from 1991 to 2003. The CAGR of main telephone lines is 6.4% and reached 1,147 million in 
2003. However, with the CAGR of 40.9%, the increase in mobile cellular subscriber is far 
ahead than the growth rate of main telephone. In 1991, the number of mobile phone users was 
only 16 million because of the high subscription price. When the price of first generation and 
second generation cellular phones sharply declined due to new technology, people rushed to 
buy it, especially during 1994-1996. The above channels of growth rates are shown in Figure 
3. Internet users have grown more dramatically with the CAGR of 47.1% during the same 
period. For example, in 1994, the growth rate of the number of users of internet doubled. The 
personal computer increased in the range 10-20% per year in 1990s. However, the 
development is not well balanced. For example, the phone subscribers of 100 inhabitants is 
185.74 in Luxembourg, on the contrast, in Niger, it is only 0.33.   
To evaluate the level of digital development, ITU uses the Digital Access Index (DAI) which 
is an overall measure of the level and diffusion of ICT technology. The DAI index is built 
around four fundamental factors that have an impact a country’s ability to access ICTs 
including: infrastructure, affordability, knowledge and quality. In addition to the developed 
countries, several Asian Tigers have achieved important success in digital society, but not in 
other areas. 
Information age gave birth to the deeply unabridged divide between poor and rich countries. 
But, at the same time, it rises a question of whether ICT prompts economic growth? There are 
examples of the possibilities to leapfrog several generations of information and technology 
development. However, the success of such actions will depend on a country’s industrial 
technology and development policy and their implementations. The East Asian and South 
East Asian countries have been successful in taking advantage of ICT in their economic and 
social development (see Jussawalla and Taylor, 2003). The impact of ICT on economic 
growth is reviewed in the next section.   
 
 
  33.  THE IMPACTS OF ICT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT   
The first studies related to ICT contribution to national economic growth conducted at the 
country level in the late 1980s and early 1990s concluded that the contribution of IT to 
productivity and economic growth was nonexistent or slight. Oliner and Sichel (1994 and 
2000) and 2002) by using the US data between 1970 and 1992 concluded that IT investment 
is too small to have substantial economic effects and ICT is only associated with 0.16–0.28 
percent additional economic growth. In more recent studies Oliner and Sichel (2002) by using 
extended data covering until 2001 show that productivity growth in the U.S. economy 
jumped during the second half of the 1990s, which many be linked to the information 
technology. However, the fall in demand for IT products, lead to a debate about the 
connection between IT and productivity and sustainability of the faster growth. The new 
results reconfirmed their previous work that the acceleration in labor productivity after 1995 
was driven largely by the greater use of IT capital goods and by the more rapid efficiency 
gains in the production of IT goods. The range of labor productivity growth is found to be in 
the interval of 2.0% and 2.75% per year and sustainable. Even much later Strassmann (1990) 
argued that there is no direct relation between spending on computers and profits or 
productivity. Moreover, Gordon (2000) argued that much of the productivity acceleration in 
1990s is driven by the business cycle and concentrated in just a few sectors of the economy.   
This  paradox  stimulated economists, management scientists, and the researcher of 
information systems to conduct more scientific analyses of the relationship between IT and 
productivity growth with larger datasets and more refined research methods. Given the 
continuous debate about whether IT investments pay off, this research reviews briefly but yet 
critically evaluates the large body of evidence-based research on the subject (for a more 
comprehensive review see Dedrick, Gurbaxani and Kraemer, 2003).   
Jorgenson (2001) found that the IT investment contributed more than one-half of the recent 
increase in the US economic growth. Since 1995 about one-half the productivity growth has 
occurred in the IT-producing sector but growth has occurred in IT-using industries as well. 
Thus, there is a considerable agreement that IT investments have had a major impact on labor 
productivity and economic growth at the country level. Kraemer and Dedrick (2001) 
confirmed that the growth in IT investment is correlated with productivity growth by using 
the data from 43 countries. Melville (2001) checked 31 industries of US with the time span 
from 1965 to 1991 and found that IT returns were positive for US as a whole and the benefit 
of IT increased with time and higher IT returns accrued to the high growth industries (see 
also Stiroh, 2002). Plice and Kraemer (2001) also examined six industrial sectors for 38 
countries and concluded that IT capital showed 5-8 times higher return on investment than 
non-IT capital for developed countries. 
Except United States, for almost all developed countries began their similar researches from 
the late of 1990s. Niininen (2001) evaluated how large the impact of computer technology to 
economic growth in Finland. Oulton (2001) reported that the contribution of ICT on GDP 
growth in U.K. was 0.36% and 0.57% in the beginning and later of 1990s respectively. 
Kegels, van Overbeke and van Zandweghe, (2002) in their analysis of the ICT contribution to 
economic performance in Belgium found that the accumulation of ICT capital resulted in an 
increasing contribution of ICT capital on output growth and average labor productivity 
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growth rose from 0.26% to 0.42%. In 2003, CEPII (2003) report that between the first and the 
second half of the 1990s, the contribution of ICT capital growth in France rose from 0.25% to 
0.45%, and during the period 1996-2000, the ICT producer sector did indeed record very 
strong gains in output per hour worked (10.7% per year), stemming from total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth. Thus, all these studies come to similar conclusions suggesting 
that ICT showed a strong trend in the late 1990s compared to the beginning of 1990s. Several 
studies based on Korean data (e.g. Seo and Lee, 2000) also show such significant 
contribution from ICT investment. In 2003, Australia National Office of Information 
Economy found that ICT and services have become pervasive, general-purpose enablers of 
economic and social transformation. Given the right policy settings, they provide the 
platforms on which the growth in productivity, innovation and social well being can be 
constructed. 
A lesser amount of related research is available in the developing countries on the ICT growth 
and its relationship with other factors. Only an Indian case study is reported by United Nation 
University (Joseph, 2002). Joseph concluded that India benefited more from ICT than harming 
other industries. The harm or reversal effect is associated with its impact on the reallocation 
of resources such as labor and affects input prices. India currently emphasize strongly on the 
role of ICT in its development and invest in ICT infrastructure and technology parks as a 
significant factor to attract FDI to enhance its economic development (see Naidu (2003). As 
pointed out previously, it might be rather difficult to reveal the truth when there is a lack of 
data with sufficient quantity and quality, especially in developing countries. 
All cross country studies choose U.S. as comparison since U.S. has achieved highest ICT 
return in the late of 1990s. Kraemer and Dedrick (1994) demonstrated that IT investment is 
positively correlated with gross domestic product (GDP) and productivity growth by using 12 
Asia-Pacific countries datasets from 1984 to 1990. Later, Dewan and Kraemer (1998 and 
2000) claimed that IT capital is positively correlated with labor productivity in developed 
countries but not in the developing countries. Their result is based on a comparison of 36 
countries with the data spanning from 1987 to 1993. Schreyer (2000) found that, in the case 
of G-7 countries, during 1990-1996, IT contributed significantly to the productivity growth in 
all seven countries, but the magnitude differs across countries.   
Daveri (2000), by using 18 OECD and European Union (EU) countries data from 1992 to 
1997, found that IT added to GDP growth in the 1990s for all countries studied, but the 
contribution in EU countries was smaller than in other industrialized countries. Within the 
EU, differences in the contribution of IT to the growth were also due to lower IT investment. 
Pohjola (2001) examined 39 countries, with the data from 1990 to 1995, and concluded that 
IT investment shows 80% gross returns for OECD countries, but developing countries did not 
experience significant returns. Kraemer and Dedrick (2001) concluded that the growth in IT 
investment is correlated with productivity growth but the level of IT investment (measured as 
% of GDP) did not correlated with productivity growth when compared 43 Countries in 
between 1985 and 1995.   
Zhen-Wei Qiang, Pitt and Ayers (2003), in examining of the contribution of ICT to the 
growth concluded that various results obtained by different countries and regions fuel the 
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OECD study suggests that the US has enjoyed markedly better results from investment in 
ICT than most other countries. In Europe, ICT’s contribution to growth has been more 
sporadic. In other regions except 4 Asian Tigers, there are few cross-country evidences on 
ICT’s contribution to economic growth.   
At the disaggregate industry or firm level, several studies confirmed that productivity growth 
remains high in IT-intensive industries and contributions to long-run productivity growth 
(1989-2001) of ICT are widely dispersed among industries (Ramirez, Kraemer and Lawler, 
2001). 
 
4.  THE ICT SECTOR IN CHINA 
From 2002, China became the first Nation in term of highest number of telephone users. This 
is not only a reflection of its population size but a direct result of improved connectivity in 
the recent years. Until September 2004, the total fixed phone users were 307 million, within 
which the city users occupied 2/3 and the remaining were rural users. Since a huge portion of 
its population living in rural China, the fixed phone usage rate of rural area is much lower 
than urban usage rate which is 36.9% (for national wide, it is 24.5%). Now the mobile phone 
user, which is mostly used by the residents of urban area are 320 million which is 13 million 
more than the users of fixed phone among which almost half of fixed phone is used for 
non-resident public and business purposes.
1 
The number of internet users also increased fast during the last 7 years. From 1997, China 
launched internet survey by the China Internet Network Information Center, after that they 
did it semiannually. In Figure 4, we show the development of the total users of internet in the 
country. From the beginning to the most recent survey which was conducted in July 2004, the 
number of users grows more than 100 times. China already becomes the second largest 
market with 87 million of internet just followed by United State with 170 million users. Even 
that, the usage in term of the whole population is very low, and is only 6.7%. Compared to 
Korea which has more than 70% internet users, China is taking extra effort to catch up with 
advanced countries in the internet connectivity. Recently, the semiannual growth rate of 
internet users in China decreased significantly. In the fourth survey in 1999, the users 
doubled just in half a year; but in fourteenth survey, the growth rate remains only 9% (Figure 
5). If China keeps the same rate of increase at 9% every half year and United State has no 
increase of number of Users, China will surpass United States and become the largest Nation 
in term of internet users within only 4 years.   
The Ministry of Information Industry announced that the average growth rate of China's ICT 
industry is forecasted to exceed 20% in the next five years. It also projects that software sales 
in China will reach US$30.8 billion by 2005. The demand for optical fiber is expected to 
                                                        
1 If fit a simple regression between the total phones used and GDP per capita in every province, we find the 
coefficient (0.005) is strongly significant with the t-value 11.0. The result is interpreted as, when the GDP per 
capita increases with 200 RMB (US$25), 100 inhabitants will own one more phone. 
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100%.  
There is also digital dividing and inequality in access and usage in the internet world within 
and between regions in China. By looking at the domain name register under the .cn, Beijing 
occupies almost 25% of whole resource, and then Shanghai and Guandong which together 
occupy another 25% of resources. Other coast areas and oversea users register another 25%, 
the rest includes west and middle together only have less than remaining 25% domain name 
registered under .cn.     
According to the recent rank by the new Digital Access Index of ITU, China has got the value 
of 0.43 which ranks 84 among 178 Nation or regions, and just followed by Fiji and Iran. It is 
not a surprising result because China’s digital success has been concentrated in the areas like 
Beijing while in other areas the level of development is similar to that of least developed 
countries. The overall state of the economy determines the ICT development as we shown 
above, but does the counter question make sense too? Namely, whether the ICT will cause 
rapid economic development compared to other capital inputs? 
 
5. THE DATA 
Since the adoption of the comprehensive reform policy in 1978, China's statistical system has 
had to follow the international statistical norms under the assistance of the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank. The system of national accounts (SNA) was completely 
implemented with national coverage in 1992. Before that, China adopted the system of 
material product balances (MPS) in which national income is value-added and comparable 
with GDP in SNA system adopted by the countries with the market-economy.   
Access to data, in sufficient quantity and with high quality is in general a limitation in 
research related to the Chinese economy. In particular data limitations related to information 
and communication technology, which is a problem not only to China but also a common 
problem to all developing countries. The data used in this study is not published and 
construction of the data series has required great amount of work, but it has resulted in a 
useful data and also guidelines to construct similar  datasets  for  other  developing  countries.       
 
5.1 Output   
The official GDP is reported in the Chinese statistical year book (CSY), where the implicit 
GDP deflator is recovered from the reported nominal and real growth rates. The resulting 
annual series of aggregate data as expected matches closely to the data used by most 
researchers, as the source of the data is the same single source. 
Table 1 shows that from 1977 to 2002, the real GDP in China grew 9.5 times and the 
compound annual growth rate is 9.4%. In 1985 when China launched its industrial reform 
program, the country achieved highest growth rate (15.2%) in its history. The second and 
third highest growth rates was in 1992 (14.2%) and 1993 (13.5%) respectively due to the Mr. 
Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on the market economy and its implementation. Because of 
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imposed by the Western countries, China suffered heavily from the low growth rates in 1989 
and 1990. After 1995, Chinese government gradually managed to regulate the economic 
growth by the Macroeconomic policy instruments, so the annual growth rate in the economy 
has again increased and stabilized at the ranges of 7% to 10%. 
 
5.2 Capital stock 
Chow (1993) and several following studies made efforts to construct capital stock series for 
the Chinese economy. The standard perpetual inventory method for calculating Chinese 
capital stock is applied in most of other studies. The method is written as: 
(1)     1 ) 1 ( − − + = t t t K I K δ     
where Kt is the current real capital stock, It is the current period real investment, Kt-1 is real 
capital stock at the beginning of current period, and δ is the depreciation rate. The calculation 
of gross fixed capital formation is based on the total social fixed asset investment which is 
referred to as gross fixed capital formation at the current price. But State Statistics Bureau of 
China (SSB) reported the price index of the fixed asset investment only from 1991. Hsueh 
and Li (1999) provided an implicit investment deflator for the period 1952-1995 and made 
measurement of capital stock by using this method possible. 
In addition to fixed assets investment, the use of the perpetual inventory method requires two 
other crucial input variables. A first such variable is the initial capital stock and a second the 
annual investment rate. Most of growth studies on China have used the capital stock 
determined in Chow (1993) for the year 1952. Scheibe (2003) interestingly noted that based 
on the same 1952 initial value, Chow (1993) and Wang and Yao (2003,WY in short) came to 
different conclusions for the year 1977, where Chow’s real capital stock is about 60% higher 
than the alternative series offered by WY (2003).   
The third parameter relevant for the construction of the capital stock series is the deprecation 
rate. These deprecation rates listed in various issues of the CSY are very low compared to 
internationally used rates, and a depreciation rate of 15% is likely to be very high, the 
resulting in the fall in capital in the early 1980s seems implausible for a rapidly emerging 
economy (Scheibe, 2003). In this paper, 8 kinds of capital stock from combination of the 
Chow (1993) and WY (2003) initial capital and assuming 4 different depreciation rates (4%, 
7%, 10% and 15%) based on Scheibe (2003) are used. Since replacement rate is lower in 
emerging economy, 7% must be a reasonable depreciation rate for capital stock construction, 
for the matter of sensitivity analysis we will use also 10% to check the consistency of the 
final result.
2   
 
                                                        
2  In order to conserve space the results for the growth rate of capital stock under assumption of different initial 
capital and depreciation rates described in above are not reported here. However, these can be obtained from the 
authors upon request. 
  85.3 Labor 
There are several ways to construct Chinese labor variable for the estimation of a production 
function. Firstly, CSY reports labor data which are annual administrative and survey-based 
estimates and using the infrequently conducted population censuses. The employment data in 
the CSY shows a big jump from 1989 to 1990. Young (2000) explains that in 1997 the 
Statistics Bureau revised employment statistics from 1990 to 1996 according to a new 
method that was applied in the census definitions. The ‘old’ system would not recognize 
temporary employed people earning less than the minimum wage of qualified permanent 
employees. On the contrary, the census definitions would recognize anybody earning a wage 
or management income as employed. The 1990 to 1997 data reflect these changes in 
definition, while the official data of 1989 and before were left unchanged.   
The second method of measuring labor is obtained from the working population multiplied 
by the participation rate and adjusted for unemployment rate which is assumed to be zero 
before 1997. WY (2003) display estimates derived from various issues of the CSY for the 
population aged 15 to 64, a series which closely represents the potential working population 
of China. We adopt WY data from 1977 to 1997 and complete it with the official data 
covering the last five years post 1997. 
From Figure 6, one can find that Chinese labor grew faster in 1980s which was 3% annually 
than in 1990s with annual growth rate of 1%. The population increases due to the natural 
birth growth even if China adopted One-Child policy from late 1970s. In 1990s, China began 
to allow employers to fire labor or to make labor lay-off, so it offsets some effect of the 
growth in working population.   
 
5.4 ICT capital stock 
From the beginning of establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese government 
considered the telecommunication industry as an important component for national security. 
Consequently, China’s investment in telecommunication area was significant even during the 
period with very low level of economic growth. The telecommunication investment share of 
total investment almost kept constant around 1%. However, during 1975-1980, the share of 
investment of ICT decreased to 0.6%. In the first five years of 1980s, it increased to 1.1% 
again. In the late 1980s, China started to invest more in ICT and reached the level of 1.62% 
of the total investment. Moreover, from 1990 to 1995, the share surprisingly reached the 
6.6% level and remained constant at the 5% level in the late 1990s. After 2000, it still 
constitutes more than 5% of the total investment (see Figure 7). The data on ICT investment 
is provided by Statistics department of Ministry of Information Industry.   
There is no deflator of ICT capital published separately. Scheibe (2003) estimated the deflator 
of ICT and transportation from 1978 to 2001. As an imputation measure, we assume that the 
year of 1977 was same as 1978 and the year of 2002 and 2003 decreased proportionally with 
the year of 2001 due to the declined information products’ prices. After adjusted by ICT 
deflator, in most years, the annual growth rate of ICT investment is below 40% and it 
fluctuates over time. In some years, the ICT investment decreased, especially in 1996 and 
2002. But in 1992 and 1993 and 1995, the ICT investment almost doubled. 
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capital stock is required. However, this data couldn’t be available directly. By using the 
following formula, we calculate the initial ICT capital as: 








0   
where   is initial investment rate,  0 I δ  is depreciation rate and  g  is the average growth 
rate of investment during the whole observation period. The average growth rate of ICT 
investment is 23% which is considered to be a high investment rate. But the depreciation rate 
is not easy to determine, because different ICT capital are depreciated differently: for 
computer, depreciation period is only 3 or 5 years, but for the communication equipments, it 
may be 15 years or more. The depreciation rate for ICT investment is around 22.4% in Korea. 
We will test the different depreciation rates which are 7%, 10%, 15% and 22.4% to get the 
different initial ICT capital stock and the growth rates of ICT capital stock. The ICT capital 
stock for remaining years can be calculated by using equation (1). The growth rate of ICT 
capital stock computed at different depreciation rates are reported in Figure 8. 
 
6. GROWTH  METHODOLOGIES   
There are two methods used in this paper, the first involves the growth accounting and the 
other is regression analysis to analyse the impact of ICT on economic growth in China.   
6.1 Growth accounting 
Growth accounting essentially divides output growth into a component that can be explained 
by input growth, and a ‘residual’ which captures changes in productivity. Consider the 
following aggregate production function for the Chinese economy: 
(3)        ) , ( ) ( ) , , ( M X F t A M X A H Q ⋅ = =
where the maximum quantity of gross output (Q) can be produced by all inputs including 
primary inputs (X), i.e. labor and capital, and intermediate inputs (M). The function also 
contains a parameter A(t)  which captures disembodied technological shifts over time. 
Disembodied technical change can be the result of research and development that leads to 
improved production processes, or technical change can be the consequence of 
learning-by-doing, or imitation. This form of technical change is also called “Hicks-neutral” 
and is “output augmenting” when it raises the maximum output that can be produced with a 
given level of primary and intermediate inputs, and without changing the relationship 
between different inputs (OECD, 2001).   
Since the technology parameter cannot be observed directly, total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth is derived as the difference between the rate of growth of a Divisia index of output 
and a Divisia index of inputs, as shown below. The Divisia index of inputs is made up of the 
logarithmic rates of change of primary and intermediate inputs, weighted with their 
respective share (S) in overall outlays for inputs: 























   
Productivity change also can be defined as a shift of the value-added function 
, i.e. as the relative increase in value added that is associated with 
technical change which cannot be directly observed but it can be shown that it corresponds to 
the difference between the growth rates of the Divisia volume index of value added (V
) , , ), ( ( P P X t A G M =
A) and 
the growth rate of the Divisia index of primary inputs. The variables P and   are output 
and material input prices. The TFP growth is then written as: 
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Under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production function and constant return to scale, the 
input vector X can be written as 
L K L K X
β β ⋅ =  where 1 = + L K β β . The parameters  K β and 
L β  are called the income share of capital and labor respectively. Then the equation (5) can 
be transformed to: 









β β − − =
•
    
  
6.2 Regression analysis 
In order to establish the relationship between ICT capital growth and TFP growth statistically, 
the following equation is estimated: 
(7)        t t ICT t v ICT TFP + + =
• •
α α0
where the coefficient  ICT α capture the impacts of ICT on economic growth. Additionally, in 
this paper, instead of assuming the income shares on an ad hoc basis, we try to use different 
income shares to compute the TFP growth. The income shares are obtained from the 
estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function and are written as: 
(8)     t t L t K t L K GDP ε β β β + + + = ) log( ) log( ) log( 0   
Where by using the ) /( L K K β β β + , we estimate the income share of capital, and 
) /( L K L β β β +  as income share of labor. It should be noted that constant returns to scale is 
assumed, i.e.  1 = + L K β β . 
 
  117. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS   
During post 1978, China experienced average real growth of more than 9% per annum with 
fewer ups and less painful downs. Curious about why China has done so well, an IMF 
research team recently examined the sources of China’s growth and arrived at a surprising 
conclusion (Fischer, 2002). Although capital accumulation, the growth of country's stock of 
capital assets, such as new factories, manufacturing machinery, and communications 
systems--was important, as were the number of workers, a sharp, sustained increase in 
productivity was the driving force behind the economic boom. During 1979-94 labor 
productivity gains accounted for more than 42% of China's growth and by the early 1990s 
had overtaken capital as the most significant source of that growth. This marks a departure 
from the traditional view of development in which capital investment takes the lead. This 
jump in productivity originated in the economic reforms begun in 1978 (Hu and Khan, 1997). 
In addition to capital accumulation, labor force and labor productivity listed above, resource 
allocation is suggested as another source of productivity growth in China. Lin (2000) argued 
that the allocation of resources among enterprises
  of different types of ownership was 
important to economic growth. Other researchers argue that, until currently, the per capita 
GDP in China has been fairly low. Given China's abundant human resources, the average 
wages is about 2% to 3.3% of that in some industrialized countries. According to the findings 
from various growth studies when the per capita GDP is low the growth rate is high. A high 
growth rate upon a relatively low base will continue to be an important trend in China's 
economic development in the foreseeable future.   
So many efforts have been made to try to trace the miracle of Chinese economy, but few of 
them mentioned the role of ICT capital. However, we can not deny the contribution of capital 
accumulation in China, in fact, especially in 1990s; the increase of capital stock in general 
played an important role to national economic growth. Among the various capital stock 
components, the ICT capital stock grew much faster than the physical capital stock. So this 
phenomenon drives us to ask whether the comprehensive ICT investment contribute more to 
the economic growth than other capital inputs.   
 
7.1 TFP growth in China   
There are several ways how researchers have obtained estimates of capital stocks by using 
different depreciation rates, different initial values of capital stock as well as different income 
shares of capital. For the reasons of sensitivity analysis, we computed a total number of 45 
different alternative combinations of capital stock variables, variable input income share and 
capital depreciation rates where TFP growth is estimated based on the equation (6).
3  
Based on the patterns of TFP growth, the following could be concluded. First, the higher 
depreciation rate of capital will lead to lower capital growth in the beginning of the 
observation period as a result the TFP growth in the beginning will be higher. When a low 
depreciation rate is used, the TFP growth in the beginning will be lower. So the TFP growth 
                                                        
3  Again these results are not reported here but can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
  12in the beginning of the period is mostly determined by the rate of depreciation. Second, the 
income share of capital influences TFP growth differently in the beginning when TFP growth 
is highly affected by the depreciation rate, but income share has a major influence later when 
the capital growth is very high comparatively. The high income share of capital (i.e. more 
than 50%) will lead to negative TFP growth in the 1989 and 1990 when China suffered from 
low GDP growth due to Tiananmen Square events and very low (less than 1%) in the late 
1990s and after 2000. The low income share of capital (i.e. less than 35%) will generate a 
high TFP growth rate (between 3% and 4%) during the end of this period compared to a high 
capital share. Thus, the rate of depreciation and the choice of initial capital stock affect the 
direction of over or underestimation of the TFP growth rate. The degree of differences among 
the alternatives is reflected in the level rather than in the temporal patterns of growth rates.   
In our view, TFP growth is an indicator of technological change and efficiency improvement 
should not fluctuate too sharp during the post-reform period of China. After the significant 
growth of TFP in 1992 and 1993 when China adopted market economy, China’s TFP growth 
cannot suddenly stop increasing in the late of 1990s. Furthermore, in the late 1990s, China 
already achieved high economic success, so the income share will be much closer to the 
developed countries in which the capital/labor income share is 35/65, especially for the East 
region which is considered as the engine of Chinese economy development. 
As analyzed by some researchers (Scheibe, 2003), 7% and 10% depreciation rates is 
reasonable for Chinese capital, and when we chosen the 15% depreciation rate for ICT capital 
which is reasonable to China compared to other countries, the aggregate depreciation rate 
should be lower than 15%. Moreover, the depreciation rate of 7% or 10% will make the TFP 
growth to be around 4% to 8% in the beginning of the period and less volatile. Thus, we find 
the rate a reasonable level based on the arguments provided with preference for a low capital 
income share mentioned previously. 
If we check the compound annual growth rate of these TFP which ranges from lower than 3% 
to above 6%, Wang and Yao’s (2003) capital stock construction will lead to a lower TFP 
growth rate compared to Chow’s (1993) approach. The high depreciation rate will result in a 
high TFP growth and the low income share of Capital also generates a high TFP growth rate. 
In China, during the successful economic transition period, it could be true that the 
reorganization of old system and reallocation of resource and the spillover of new technology 
due to the open-door policy played the most important role to the economic growth. 
By using the model (7), where we assume 7% and 10% depreciation rate for capital and 15% 
depreciation rate for ICT, all regression results are reported in Table 2. From the regression 
result, for the 30% capital income share, all results are significant at the 5% level of 
significance. Some values of Durbin Watson (DW) are very low, after adjusting for the 
autocorrelation (ρ), the coefficients is still significant and it does not change much. For the 
35% capital income share, all results are significant at 10% except the capital constructed by 
Chow method with the 10% depreciation rate. For 46% and 59% the income share of capital, 
the results of Chow’s will not be significant even with 7% depreciation rate, but it is still 
significant for Wang and Yang’s data. However, the coefficient drops a little. In the view of 
depreciation rate, the 7% rate will generate more significant and higher TFP growth results 
than 10% depreciation rate. In sum, the data constructed by Wang and Yang seems to lead to 
  13more robust results compared to Chow’s method.   
The ICT coefficients from the above regressions range from 0.064 to 0.084, after some 
adjustment, they converge to a value around 0.076. That means one percent ICT capital 
growth in China can generate 0.076% TFP growth. The average ICT capital growth rate in 
China of last two decades is 26.4%, so the TFP growth due to ICT is around 2%. For China 
average TFP growth rate is 5.3% according the capital data constructed by Wang and Yang 
with the 7% depreciation rate, so the contribution of ICT to TFP growth is around 38% and 
contribution to annual GDP growth rate of 9.4% is around 21.2%. It seems high, but when we 
recognize that it not only includes the capital deepening effect and technology improvement 
but also include the effects of resource reallocations, and reorganization effects in both ICT 
and non-ICT sectors, it is not so surprising. 
 
7.2 TFP growth with estimated income share   
In equation (8), by using the different capital stock variables we can obtain the estimated 
income shares of capital and labor, respectively. However, the sum of capital and labor 
coefficients may not be 1 which will violate the assumption of growth accounting. If we 
assume that the sum is 1 and divide the coefficient with real sum, we could get the 
normalized approximate income shares which equal to 1. 
The coefficients of capital and labor listed in Table 3 show that no combination will yield 
constant return to scale. All cases where it is assumed that the sum of the coefficients of 
capital and labor equal to 1 are rejected based on Wald hypothesis. A non-constant returns to 
scale is expected given the Chinese growing economy with significant new investment, 
reallocation of resources, factor mobility, training and reorganizations. This is evidence of the 
fact that Chinese economic growth partly must be attributed to the increasing returns of scale 
(see results in Table 3). Even that, we get the income shares of capital and labor normalized 
to constant returns to scale. Results show that: (i) Chow’s capital stock construction yields 
low capital income share compared to Wang and Yao’s, and (ii) the higher depreciation rate 
for capital will generate lower capital income share. That is quite reasonable since when 
capital depreciates faster, the total capital will shrink faster, then its share will be low in total 
income. Previously calculated labor income shares, though some based on the wage share of 
total GDP bear some problem. The problem arises because many of welfare for the labor are 
not reflected in wage payments. These payments are basically in the form housing or heath 
care and other compensations which cannot be captured by wages, and several of which are 
not observable. 
Since the income share is estimated from different capital stock, so it will be fixed for each 
capital stock in the calculation of the TFP growth. The average TFP growth rate of each 
alternative capital stock is shown in Figure 9. It ranges from 4% to 7%. Wang and Yao’s 
construction of capital stock will lead to lower TFP growth compared to Chow’s construction. 
And the high depreciation rate will have high TFP growth. The regression results are reported 
in Table 4. All estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level and the 
coefficient of ICT capital growth is around 0.076 to 0.083. So these results are consistent 
with the result where we directly assume the income share is around 30% or 35% for the 
  14capital and capital depreciation rate of 7%. Consequently, ICT growth contributes to TFP 
growth by around 2%, implying that around 21% of the GDP growth is due to growth in ICT 
capital investment. 
 
7.3 Dynamic income share construction and ICT contribution 
It is true that the income share of capital and labor inputs will change according to the 
temporal patterns of economic development. At the beginning of industrialization, the share 
of labor will be low; the most part of value added will be related to the capital input, however, 
then the late, labor will gain more. For the developed countries, the income share is set for 
30% for capital and 70% for labor; we assume nowadays, the China’s income shared is same 
as this level which was proved by the estimated results presented above. In Chinese Statistical 
year book, the compensation of labor account for 50%-55% of the cost in recent years. 
However, as discussed above, this compensation underestimates the welfare of labor. In 
China, even if new policy about the allocation of resident was adopted several years ago, 
most employees still access housing offered by their company or by the government. 
Furthermore, most company still provides non-salary benefits in the form of transportation, 
telecommunication, food as well as other benefits. Then, the total welfare enjoyed by labor 
will be more than 70% of total GDP. 
In allowing the income shares to vary over time and to be consistent with empirical evidence 
we constructed new income share labeled as dynamic income shares. The construction of the 
new time variant shares involves a number of steps. First, we normalize the capital and labor 
inputs to the level in 2002. Capital is in constant price. As discussed above, Chow’s 7% 
depreciation rate and Wang’s 7% and 10% depreciation rate are reasonable for China 
economy growth, so we just normalize these three alternatives. Second, the difference 
between the normalized labor and capital is calculated. Third, the gap added to 1 multiplied 
with 0.30 which is the income share of capital (Table 5) will produce a time variant capital 
share. Since the labor growth slower than capital, so after normalization, the difference will 
be positive, and the income share of capital will be greater than 30% in the every year before 
2002. In the last step, the TFP growth is reported in Figure 10. 
The CAGR of TFP for Chow’s 7% and Wang and Yang’s 7% and 10% are 5.1%, 4.4% and 
4.5%, respectively. Using these results, estimation of ICT growth on TFP growth is reported 
in Table 6. The coefficient and its level of significance are somewhat lower than the previous 
results based on time-invariant shares. The capital, constructed by Wang and Yang is more 
robust than Chow’s. The lower coefficient is interpreted as if we use a constant income share, 
the contribution of ICT to economic growth will be somewhat overestimated, but not very 
much. Given the coefficient is 0.069 and CAGR of ICT, TFP and GDP are 26.4%, 4.4% and 
9.4%. Out of the 4.4% TFP growth, 1.8% or 41% is due to ICT capital. For the GDP growth, 




  158. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION   
ICT sector over time enjoy a growing importance in the Chinese economy. The contribution 
of ICT to the economic growth has not invoked much attention from economists. This paper 
employed three different methods to evaluate the contribution of ICT on the economic growth 
at the national level. The estimated results are then contrasted with those found in the 
literature. The following conclusion can be drawn from this research. 
In similarity with the evidences from developed countries on the ICT and economic growth 
relationship, the results here suggest that ICT contributes significantly to the Chinese 
economic growth, rejecting the productivity growth paradox hypothesis, suggesting no 
positive effects. The contribution is in particular more evident in 1990s, but the contribution 
is lower in 1980s. Based in our calculations, ICT accounts for up to 20% of the GDP growth 
and about 38% for of the TFP Growth.   
Different rates of depreciation have previously been suggested in relation to the construction 
of capital stock series. We find that a rate equivalent to 7% for Chinese aggregate capital 
stock is more reasonable than other commonly used rates of 4%, 10% or 15%. However, for 
ICT capital, the depreciation rate of 15% is more preferable. The TFP growth rate is positive 
and increasing function of the rate of depreciation of capital. Higher depreciation rate will 
generate higher TFP. Thus, over or underestimation of the depreciation rate biases the 
estimated rate of economic growth. 
In the literature the Chinese economic growth is explained by contributions from capital 
accumulations, labor input, and increase labor productivity growth. In the beginning of 
Chinese post-reform period, the contribution from labor was significant, but not in the later 
period, even if the income shares of labor raised.   
The average annual TFP growth in China from 1978 to 2002 is around 4% to 5%. It has 
played an important role to the economic development in China improving the welfare of 
millions of Chinese, reducing poverty, but also increasing inequality within and between 
regions. Implementation of new macroeconomic deregulation policy together with gained 
experience, skills, technology transfer, and capital accumulation has affected positively the 
TFP growth rate and its stability over time. 
Concerning the income shares factor input, it is common to use 0.30 and 0.70 on an ad hoc 
basis for capital and labor. Our parametric estimated shares of 0.35 and 0.65, based on 
production function approach are reasonable and confirmed by different methods of 
estimation. At the same time, the income share of ICT capital increases gradually and amount 
to almost 2-3% in recent years.   
This paper has pointed out a number of improvements concerning decomposition of capital 
stock into traditional physical capital and ICT capital inputs and the estimation of factor input 
shares used in the computation of TFP growth in China. Future research should attempt to 
improve our understanding of a number of issues as follows. First, advance could be made 
along with identification of some factors that influence ICT investment and its contribution to 
the economic growth. Second, construction of more accurately measured non-ICT capital to 
analyze the contribution of capital input will reduce biases in the estimated growth rate. Third, 
a further decomposition of ICT capital into telecommunication equipment, internet, hard and 
  16software components will contribute to our understanding of the deriving forces of economic 
growth and their individual contribution and policy options. Finally, the implications of the 
strong assumptions of constant returns to scale and time invariant factor input shares of 
production deserve further investigation.   
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1978 6592  23396  453.3 11.71  1.62     
1979 7093  23840  463.4  7.60  1.90  2.23 
1980 7632  24485  479.0  7.60  2.71  3.37 
1981 8029  24723  495.0  5.20  0.97  3.35 
1982 8759  25415  513.4  9.09  2.80  3.72 
1983 9714  26300  526.7 10.90  3.48  2.59 
1984 11191  27549  547.4  15.20  4.75  3.93 
1985 12702  29095  567.1  13.50  5.61  3.60 
1986 13819  31109  583.6  8.79  6.92  2.91 
1987 15422  33854  601.2  11.60  8.82  3.02 
1988 17165  36924  619.4  11.30  9.07  3.03 
1989 17869  38991  631.0  4.10  5.60  1.87 
1990 18548  40779  647.5  3.80  4.59  2.61 
1991 20254  43033  654.9  9.20  5.53  1.14 
1992 23130  46421  661.5  14.20  7.87  1.01 
1993 26253  51350  668.1  13.50  10.62  1.00 
1994 29561  57413  674.6  12.60  11.81  0.97 
1995 32665  64107  680.7  10.50  11.66  0.90 
1996 35801  71410  689.5  9.60  11.39  1.29 
1997 38951  79030  698.2  8.80  10.67  1.26 
1998 41989  87899  706.4  7.80  11.22  1.17 
1999 44970  96942  713.9  7.10  10.29  1.06 
2000 48568  106728  720.9  8.00  10.09  0.98 
2001 52114  117918  730.3  7.30  10.48  1.30 
2002 56283  131583  737.3  8.00  11.59  0.96 
Source: Scheibe (2003), GDP and Capital are in 1990 constant price. 
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rate researcher  Coefficient  Std. error  t-value  p-value  R2 
30 7  Chow  0.0734 0.0346 2.1364 0.0435  0.1656
30 10  Chow  0.0650 0.0357 1.8205 0.0817  0.1260
30 7  WY  0.0841 0.0321 2.6225 0.0152  0.2302
 ρ =0.628, using y’t=(1- ρ) yt 
 x’t=(1- ρ)xt to adjust  0.0762 0.0389 1.9561 0.0633 0.1482
30 10  WY 0.0766 0.0326 2.3540 0.0275  0.1942
 ρ =0.52, using y’t=(1- ρ) yt 
 x’t=(1- ρ)xt to adjust  0.0796 0.0364 2.1871 0.0397 0.1786
35 7  Chow  0.0688 0.0353 1.9465 0.0639  0.1414
35 10  Chow  0.0584 0.0370 1.5800 0.1278  0.0979
35 7  WY  0.0807 0.0321 2.5138 0.0194  0.2155
35 10  WY 0.0720 0.0329 2.1858 0.0393  0.1720
46 7  Chow  0.0571 0.0377 1.5136 0.1438  0.0906
46 7  WY  0.0730 0.0327 2.2322 0.0356  0.1781
59 7  Chow  0.0442 0.0413 1.0699 0.2958  0.0474
59 7  WY  0.0644 0.0341 1.8888 0.0716  0.1343
 
Table 3. Regression results to estimate factor shares, Dependent variable is log(GDP). 
Coefficient  Chow 4  Chow 7  chow 10  chow 15  WY 4  WY 7  WY 10  WY 15 
Log(Labor)  1.6181 2.0957 2.4687 2.8934  0.8874 1.3584  1.7551 2.2494 
Log(capital)  0.7694 0.6974 0.6284 0.5324  0.8010 0.7438  0.6848 0.5966 
 
Table 4. Regression results with estimated factor shares, Dependent variable is TFP and independent 




rate Researcher  coefficient  std error  t-value  p-value  R2 
32  4  Chow  0.0805 0.0338 2.3794 0.0260 0.1975 
25  7  Chow  0.0790 0.0340 2.3206 0.0295 0.1897 
20  10  Chow  0.0782 0.0340 2.2967 0.0311 0.1866 
15.5  15  Chow  0.0781 0.0339 2.3074 0.0304 0.1880 
47.5  4  WY  0.0833 0.0315 2.6419 0.0146 0.2328 
35.4  7  WY  0.0805 0.0321 2.5047 0.0198 0.2143 
28  10  WY  0.0785 0.0325 2.4181 0.0239 0.2027 
21  15  WY  0.0761 0.0327 2.3270 0.0291 0.1906 
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W Y      1 0 %  
labor 
1977 42.78  57.21 44.62 55.38 44.05  55.95
1978 43.11  56.89 44.81 55.19 44.32  55.68
1979 43.41  56.58 44.99 55.01 44.59  55.41
1980 43.90  56.09 45.37 54.63 45.03  54.97
1981 44.50  55.50 45.86 54.14 45.60  54.40
1982 45.09  54.90 46.35 53.65 46.15  53.85
1983 45.43  54.57 46.59 53.41 46.45  53.55
1984 45.99  54.01 47.06 52.94 46.96  53.04
1985 46.44  53.56 47.43 52.57 47.36  52.64
1986 46.65  53.35 47.56 52.44 47.52  52.48
1987 46.74  53.26 47.58 52.42 47.53  52.47
1988 46.78  53.22 47.55 52.45 47.50  52.50
1989 46.78  53.21 47.48 52.52 47.50  52.50
1990 47.04  52.95 47.69 52.31 47.77  52.23
1991 46.80  53.16 47.42 52.58 47.56  52.44
1992 46.33  53.67 46.86 53.14 47.02  52.98
1993 45.48  54.52 45.95 54.05 46.08  53.92
1994 44.36  55.64 44.77 55.23 44.86  55.14
1995 43.08  56.92 43.44 56.56 43.49  56.51
1996 41.77  58.23 42.08 57.92 42.10  57.90
1997 40.39  59.61 40.65 59.35 40.66  59.34
1998 38.70  61.30 38.91 61.09 38.90  61.10
1999 36.95  63.05 37.10 62.90 37.11  62.89
2000 35.00  65.00 35.11 64.89 35.13  64.87
2001 32.83  67.17 32.89 67.11 32.92  67.08
2002 30.00  70.00 30.00 70.00 30.00  70.00
 
Table 6. Regression results based on time variant factor shares. Dependent variable is TFP and 
independent variable is ICT capital growth rate.     
   Coefficient  std error t-value  p-value  R2 
WY  7%  0.0689  0.0307 2.2419 0.0349 0.1793 
WY  10%  0.0573  0.0321 1.7844 0.0875 0.1216 
Chow  7%  0.0538  0.0350 1.5367 0.1380 0.0931 
 
 